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A NEUROSCIENCE OF
ENLIGHTENMENT?
The field of contemplative science is
rapidly growing and integrating into the
basic neurosciences, psychology, clinical
sciences, and society-at-large. Yet the
majority of current research in the contemplative sciences has been divorced
from the soteriological context from which
these meditative practices originate and
has focused instead on clinical applications with goals of stress reduction and
psychotherapeutic health. In the existing research on health outcomes of
mindfulness-based clinical interventions,
for example, there have been almost no
attempts to scientifically investigate the
goal of enlightenment. This is a serious
oversight, given that such profound transformation across ethical, perceptual, emotional, and cognitive domains are taken
to be the natural outcome and principle
aim of mindfulness practice in the traditional Buddhist contexts from which these
practices are derived. If short-term interventions as short as a few sessions are
now beginning to produce neuroplastic
changes (Tang et al., 2010; Zeidan et al.,
2010; Xue et al., 2011), it may be that
even in secular contexts, practitioners are
already developing states and traits that are
associated with progress toward enlightenment. In order to carefully assess the
potential effects of meditative interventions it is of singular importance to ask
whether enlightenment can be traced to
specific neural correlates, cognition, or
behavior.

NO: ENLIGHTENMENT NEEDS
SPECIFICATION
Unfortunately, the first answer to
this question is “No.” The term
‘‘enlightenment” is an extraordinarily
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imprecise construct. Using the term
enlightenment or even the term more
native to Buddhist traditions, “awakening” (bodhi), as if it referred to a single
outcome either privileges one conception
over others or else assumes that there is
some commonality among the traditional
goals of diverse contemplative traditions.
There are deep disagreements over the
nature of the goal between and even
within various Buddhist schools. Scientific
investigations cannot assume that there
is any commonality among the transformative changes referred to as “kensho,”
“stream entry,” “realizing the nature of
mind,” and so on, that various Buddhist
traditions take as various stages of awakening. Empirical investigations of these
constructs can only proceed with reference
to the specific psychological and behavioral outcomes described in the native
discourse of a specific tradition (see Lutz
et al., 2007). Because we do not have space
here to offer detailed examinations of the
theoretical context and neurobiological
characterization of enlightenment as it is
specified in multiple Buddhist traditions,
we focus here on one specific example,
that of the Theravāda Buddhist tradition
of the Burmese meditation master Mahasi
Sayadaw. Nonetheless, by applying more
generally the approach we adopt here for
this tradition, claims for commonality or
differences between psychological states
and traits associated with various traditional goals can be operationalized as
testable hypotheses.
While some Buddhist traditions understand the goal of nibbāna just as a cessation
of unwholesome mental states, Mahasi
Sayadaw maintains that nibbāna “can be
seen inwardly as the cessation of all phenomena” (Sayadaw, 1992). This Theravāda
Buddhist tradition distinguishes between a

“path” moment and the immediately subsequent “fruition” state, which can later be
repeated and cultivated. As Khema (1994)
describes it, “the path moment doesn’t
have any thinking or feeling in it. . . While
the meditative absorptions bring with
them a feeling of oneness, of unity, the
path moment does not even contain that.
The moment of fruition, subsequent to the
path moment, is the understood experience and results in a turned-around vision
of existence. . . The new understanding recognizes every thought, every feeling as
stress (dukkha)” (Khema, 1994). Of particular note here is how the “fruition”
attainment (phala-samāpatti) of experiencing or “seeing” cessation that results
from insight practice is sharply distinguished by these Theravâda teachers from
various results of concentration, including the cessation of consciousness characteristic of the concentrative absorption nirodha samāpatti (Griffiths, 1986),
as well as from secular goals of stress
reduction, and also from other Buddhist
conceptions. For instance, according to
some schools of Tibetan Buddhism, an
enlightened awareness “sees” all phenomena as truly beyond suffering, as
an inseparable emptiness-luminosity-bliss
state, not different in nature from awareness itself.
Given the differences between various
competing conceptions of awakening, one
scientific approach to tracing enlightenment would be to use the tools of social
psychology to investigate which states and
traits are valued in a particular community. For instance, recent work in moral
psychology suggests how value judgments
of people and practices as either enlightened or unenlightened could be traced
to affective reactions of admiration and
disgust (Rozin et al., 1999; Schnall et al.,
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2008; Brandt and Reyna, 2011; Schnall and
Roper, 2011). Some of the most virulent
disagreements over what counts as genuine
awakening occur between closely related
practice traditions, such as the debates
between various Theravāda Buddhist traditions in Burma over which states are
to count as realizations of nibbāna and
which are instead to be counted (merely)
as states of deep concentration. Surveying
these debates, Sharf (1995) concludes
“there is no public consensus as to
the application of terms that supposedly
refer to discreet experiential states within
the vipassanā movement” (Sharf, 1995,
p. 265).
It is important in this regard to separate two sorts of disagreement, the one
centering on which states are taken to be
worthy of the title of awakening, the other
on the accuracy of self-reports of experiential states that may reflect markers of
progress. Even within communities where
there is consensus on which states/traits
deserve to be called enlightened, there can
be disagreement over whether or not particular individuals have attained these. In
practice, as Sharf (1995) details, Buddhist
teachers do not accept self-reports of meditative experience at face value, but instead
assess whether a particular reported state
should be counted as a case of realization
depending on practice history, the manner and emotional state with which the
report is given, and retrospective observations of behavior. This kind of skepticism is emphasized in Buddhist theory
(Olendzki, 2010) and also recent cognitive science (Clark, 1997; Knauper and
Turner, 2003; Mehling et al., 2009) suggesting unreliability of self-report, due to
affective biases of attention and memory,
as well as poor validity and generalizability. Fortunately, objective measures of
such affective biases of perception and
cognition have been developed (Elliott
et al., 2010), and recent work suggests
that certain forms of meditation practice may function precisely by attenuating
such biases (Vago and Nakamura, 2011;
Garland et al., 2012; Van Vugt et al., 2012;
Kang et al., 2013). This leads us to a qualified optimism for studies drawing on a
nuanced understanding of the specific traditional context of a specific conception
of enlightenment and leveraging objective
measures of experiential acuity.

Neural Correlates of Enlightenment?

A QUALIFIED YES: RECENT PROGRESS
AND METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
By
integrating
evidence
from
neuroimaging with evidence of behavioral
transformations specified in particular
traditional descriptions of meditation
practices, some important obstacles may
be mitigated. For instance, in an adaptation of the Mahasi method developed
by Shinzen Young, practitioners use the
label “Gone” to refer to the “fruition”
experience of cessation described above.
According to Young, this kind of experience is not uncommon for advanced
practitioners (Young, 2013). Indeed, in
a recent study conducted with adept
practitioners of this system, two subjects
reported having a temporary experience
of cessation while in the scanner environment. The methodology was unique in
this experiment given that button presses
were used to indicate temporal markers associated with peak level of clarity
or contact with a sustained period of
“rest” that follows ordinary experience of
a particular sensory object passing or vanishing from conscious awareness. Using
traditional methods of fMRI analyses, we
were able to investigate the functional
correlates of the deeper experiences of
cessation in comparison to the more common experience of the passing away of
a sensory object. The preliminary results
suggest a number of very unique functional changes in particular brain regions
that were similar in activation for “rest”
in the other meditators, but the magnitude of the hemodynamic change from
baseline was much larger. For example, the
frontal polar cortex (Brodmann area-10), a
specialized area for higher cognitive functions (Koechlin et al., 1999; Ramnani and
Owen, 2004), showed dramatic increases
in functional activity (>50% BOLD signal
change) that were not as large for the other
meditators. As interesting as this preliminary finding is, we can not simply say we
found the neural correlate of cessation, but
rather a potential neural marker for the
experience of “Gone” in Young’s system
of training that is relative to the baseline
state of mind wandering in this individual. Because of the limitations associated
with traditional analyses, we are currently
attempting to explore this state using more
novel methods that do not require the state
of interest to be contrasted with a state of
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no interest, such as state space analyses
[see Janoos et al. (2011)].
One major problem in using neuroimaging methodology is that it is typically dependent upon the general linear
model (GLM), a convenient method that
flexibly allows for both linear regression
and ANOVA; however, the model relies on
assumptions that may not hold in all situations. For example, fMRI has a poor
temporal resolution limited by a hemodynamic response function for each brain
response or “state” that is approximately
12 s in duration; any attempts at exploring discrete states within this timeframe
is likely to be influenced by “bleeding
over” of hemodynamic activity from the
previous state. Furthermore, another limitation of the GLM is its dependence on
creating a contrast between states of interest and some other state of no interest.
The assumptions and limitations are likely
to fail in attempts to capture the subtle changes associated with normative, but
transitory, states of enlightenment.
Nonetheless, important progress has
been made. Some studies investigating
long-term meditators with mixed traditions have attempted to map correlational
neurophysiology with first-person experiences of clarity, somatic awareness, nonduality, and mind-wandering in adept
meditators (Lutz et al., 2004; Josipovic
et al., 2012; Garrison et al., 2013; Hagerty
et al., 2013; Kerr et al., 2013; Vago et al.,
2013). Indeed, neural correlates of particular meditative states show a developmental
trajectory, such that there is a similar pattern of development regardless of cultural
background or technique early on in meditative naïve practitioners, but that such
markers change throughout expertise and
experience (e.g., Brefczynski-Lewis et al.,
2007). More recently, attempts have been
made to operationalize meditation in very
specific contexts of automaticity (Travis,
2011) and non-duality (Josipovic, 2010).
Some studies have focused on expert practitioners with the assumption that unique
neurophysiology amongst these meditators (in comparison to meditation naïve
control subjects) may point to particular biomarkers of advancement toward
end-goals of practice. For example, Lutz
et al. (2004) found gamma band electroencephalography (EEG) power over lateral frontal and parietal electrode sites
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to correlate (r = 0.69) with self-reported
clarity in expert Tibetan practitioners
of “non-referential compassion” (Tibetan:
dmigs med snying rje), suggesting a particular mechanism for increased phenomenal
intensity. More recently, a number of studies have also found gamma band activity
across different electrode sites to correlate
with particular meditative states across different contemplative traditions (Lehmann
et al., 2001; Vialatte et al., 2009; Cahn
et al., 2010, 2013; Rubik, 2011; BerkovichOhana et al., 2012; Ferrarelli et al., 2013;
Kozhevnikov et al., 2013), some suggesting
increased gamma power correlates with
level of experience and may be a marker
of plasticity that remains during restful or
even states of deep sleep (Ferrarelli et al.,
2013).

CONCLUSIONS
Scientific investigation of mindfulness
and meditation have already arguably
advanced the field of neuroscience and
specifically our knowledge of the brain
(e.g., “resting states”) in the context of
functional neuroimaging [see Holzel et al.
(2011); Vago and Silbersweig (2012) for
review]. Once biomarkers are established
for progress along the paths outlined in
particular traditions, these can be used
as feedback (e.g., Garrison et al., 2013),
or for therapeutic targets in the context
of neuropsychiatry. It is therefore, necessary to responsibly unpack traditional constructs into common psychological and
neurocognitive terms that can correlate
with first-person experience with some
consistency, but without unwittingly dismissing the deepest and most fundamental
features of the practices from which they
originate. We are, in the end, cautiously
optimistic that progress can be made on
well-defined projects in this area that integrate behavior and phenomenology with
neuroimaging evidence, but not without a
careful consideration of the methodological obstacles. Responsible scientific investigations of enlightenment can proceed only
on the basis of rigorous understanding
of particular experiential states or behavioral traits within a particular tradition
as part of a whole value system, embedded in many other aspects of the models
employed in that specific tradition of how
the mind works and how awakening progresses.
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